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INDEFINITE DETENTION OF SPECIALLY DANGEROUS 
REMOVABLE ALIENS: HERNANDEZ-CARRERA V. 
CARLSON AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY 
DEFERENCE 
Kathleen L. Cassidy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After serving time in prison for serious criminal offenses, aliens 
Santos Hernandez-Carrera and Pablo Santiago Hernandez-Arenado were 
taken into custody by United States immigration officials and have each 
been detained for more than fifteen years.1  During their detention, both 
men were diagnosed with severe mental illnesses.2  Immigration judges 
issued orders to remove them from the country, concluding that they 
would pose a serious community threat to the community if released.3  
Because Cuba, their native country, refused to accept the two aliens, the 
U.S. government was unable to remove them and, consequently, 
detained them indefinitely.4 
The lack of uniformity in federal immigration law among the federal 
circuit courts calls into question the permissibility of the indefinite 
detention of aliens who are ordered removed.5  As a result of the circuit 
split, a mentally ill alien with a violent criminal history could be 
detained indefinitely in one part of the country and released in another 
after a six-month period.  Further complicating this issue is the difficulty 
(and necessity) of balancing due process rights with the public’s safety. 
The removal process begins when Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), determines that an alien6 is subject to removal.7  Following 
 * Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to give special thanks to her family and Richard Tranter for their continued love and encouragement. 
 1. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1242–44 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1011 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 1242–44. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id.; Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 2008); Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 
791–92 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 6. Alien is defined as “[a] person who resides within the borders of a country but is not a citizen 
or subject of that . . . country.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 30 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). 
 7. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT: MENTAL DISABILITY, UNFAIR 
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arrest, ICE begins deportation proceedings.8  A series of hearings are 
then scheduled in immigration court to determine whether the alien is 
entitled to remain in the United States.9  If an immigration judge issues a 
final order of removal, the alien may appeal to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA).10  Should the alien lose this appeal, the alien “may file a 
petition for review of this decision with the appropriate [f]ederal 
[c]ircuit [c]ourt of [a]ppeals.”11  In extraordinary cases, the United 
States Supreme Court will review lower court decisio 12
Following an order of removal, indefinite detention becomes an issue 
when the government is unable to effectuate the alien’s removal within a 
reasonable time.13  An alien is typically held in custody for the ninety-
day statutory removal period, during which the government works to 
secure the alien’s removal from the United States.14  After this period, 
the alien may be released from detention, subject to supervision, if the 
government is unable to succeed in removal efforts.15  If, however, the 
alien is determined to be “specially dangerous,” the alien may be 
detained indefinitely, despite both the expiration of the statutory removal 
period and the fact that the alien is unlikely to be removed.16  A 
“specially dangerous” alien detained indefinitely is, however, entitled to 
periodic assessments of this status by an immigration court.17  Further, 
the detainee may challenge the continued detention by filing a petition 
for habeas corpus in federal district court.18 
Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson created a split among the federal 
circuit courts when the Tenth Circuit determined that indefinite 
detention of removable aliens was permissible under certain “special 
circumstances.”  Part II of this Comment examines the statutory 
HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE US IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 3 (2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.; see also id. at 21 (“The proceedings themselves involve two stages: first, a determination 
of whether the person is inadmissible or deportable; and second, determination of whether the person is 
eligible for any discretionary or mandatory relief from removal.”). 
 10. Id. at 24. 
 11. Id.  Additionally, federal district courts do not hear appeals of deportation orders, but they do 
hear petitions for habeas corpus challenging unlawful detention.  Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 77 (“In some cases, a non-citizen who has been ordered deported by an immigration 
judge cannot be expeditiously removed to the country of origin because it does not have diplomatic 
relations or repatriation agreements with the US, refuses to receive the person for other reasons, or 
simply fails to provide travel documents.”). 
 14. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 15. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2010). 
 16. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) (2010); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 66. 
 17. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(k) (2010); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 78. 
 18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 81; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2010). 
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provisions and Supreme Court decisions that are relevant to the issue of 
indefinite detention of removable aliens.  Part III analyzes the Fifth, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ decisions regarding federal habeas corpus 
petitions filed by aliens challenging their indefinite detentions.  Part IV 
discusses deficiencies in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ decisions and 
provides recommendations to ensure the consistent application of federal 
immigration law.  Part V concludes that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
Hernandez-Carrera was superior because it accounts for tenets of 
administrative law by giving deference to the Attorney General’s 
statutory construction while simultaneously remaining within 
constitutional boundaries. 
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND BACKGROUND 
The focus of the circuit split revolves around the “[i]nadmissible or 
criminal aliens” statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which states that: 
[a]n alien ordered removed who is inadmissible . . . , removable . . . , or 
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the 
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be 
detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject 
to . . . terms of supervision . . . .19 
Significantly, 8 C.F.R. § 241.14—the Attorney General’s “special 
circumstances” regulation—is used to determine whether continued 
detention of a removable alien is warranted when the alien is “specially 
dangerous.”20  Below, subparts A and B discuss the “[i]nadmissible or 
criminal aliens” statute, as well as the Attorney General’s “special 
circumstances” regulation.  Additionally, subpart C addresses the 
Supreme Court’s rulings concerning the propriety of judicial deference 
to an agency’s statutory construction. 
A. Detention and Removal of Aliens Who Are Ordered Removed: 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) 
The provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) at 
issue in the circuit courts, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), titled “[i]nadmissible 
or criminal aliens,” authorizes the Attorney General to prolong the 
detention of certain classes of aliens beyond the removal period.21  The 
statute applies to three classes of aliens: (1) aliens who do not meet 
 19. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 20. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2010). 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
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statutory admission qualifications and who have been “ordered 
removed;”22 (2) aliens who have been “ordered removed” for security or 
policy reasons or because they violated status requirements, entry 
conditions, or criminal laws; or (3) aliens “ordered removed” who have 
been deemed by the Attorney General to pose a community safety risk 
or who the Attorney General believes may flee the jurisdiction.23  The 
goal of this provision is two-fold: to ensure that aliens will appear at 
subsequent immigration proceedings, and to provide for the safety of the 
community by continued detention.24 
B. The Attorney General’s Construction of the “[I]nadmissible or 
[C]riminal [A]liens” Statute 
In furtherance of the post-removal provision of the INA, federal 
regulation 8 C.F.R. § 241.14—the “special circumstances” provision—
allows the U.S. government to “continue detention of particular 
removable aliens on account of special circumstances even though there 
is no significant likelihood that the alien will be removed in the 
reasonably foreseeable future.”25  The U.S. Attorney General 
promulgated this regulation in response to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Zadvydas v. Davis, which held impermissible the indefinite detention 
of certain aliens.26  The regulation provides for the continued detention 
of certain categories of aliens in a manner that comports with 
constitutional requirements for due process.27  The revised provision, in 
compliance with Zadvydas, narrows the scope of the INA’s authority to 
detain aliens indefinitely after a removal order has been finalized.28  The 
Attorney General drafted the regulation in a manner that interpreted the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute as an authorization of an 
 22. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West 2010) (discussing “Admission Qualifications for Aliens”). 
 23. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 24. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).  In dicta, the Court in Zadvydas determined 
that the statute’s basic purpose is to effectuate removal of aliens and that the provision is part of that 
statute.  Id. at 690.  There is some disagreement about the purpose of the statute, but courts have failed 
to analyze the statute’s purpose in greater detail.  See Myrna Pages, Note, Indefinite Detention: Tipping 
the Scale Toward the Liberty Interest of Freedom After Zadvydas v. Davis, 66 ALB. L. REV. 1213, 
1227–28 (2003) (discussing the statute’s purpose and the purpose of extended detention, noting that 
Justice Kennedy, in his Zadvydas dissent, argued that the purpose of extended detention is to ensure 
public safety, not to effectuate removal). 
 25. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(a) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 26. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. 
 27. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1011 (2009). 
 28. See id. at 1251–55; see also Marquez-Coromina v. Hollingsworth, 692 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569–
70 (D. Md. 2010). 
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alien’s prolonged detention in limited circumstances, subject to specific 
procedural requirements.29 
Under the “special circumstances” provision, there are “four 
categories of aliens whose special circumstances warrant continued 
detention,” including “aliens determined to pose a special danger to the 
public.”30  In order to prolong the detention of an alien who falls within 
this “special danger to the public” category, the government must follow 
certain procedural requirements.  First, the government must 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the alien has 
committed “crimes of violence;”31 (2) the alien is likely to commit 
future acts of violence as a result of “a mental condition or personality 
disorder;” and (3) there are no release conditions that “can reasonably be 
expected to ensure the safety of the public.”32  Once this evidentiary 
standard is satisfied, the procedure for continued detention requires a 
medical and psychiatric examination of the alien,33 a referral to an 
immigration judge,34 a reasonable cause hearing35 as well as a merits 
hearing,36 and, if warranted, periodic case reviews once the alien has 
 29. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1245. 
 30. Id. at 1243; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(b)–(d), (f).  The other categories of aliens whose 
special circumstances warrant continued detention are: “(1) aliens with a highly contagious disease that 
is a threat to public safety; (2) aliens detained on account of serious adverse foreign policy consequences 
of release; (3) aliens detained on account of security or terrorism concerns . . . .”  Hernandez-Carrera, 
547 F.3d at 1243 (citation omitted). 
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006) (defining a crime of violence and noting “[t]he term ‘crime of 
violence’ means — (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, 
by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may 
be used in the course of committing the offense”). 
 32. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1)(i)–(iii); see also 18 U.S.C. § 16. 
 33. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(3). 
 34. Id. § 241.14(g) (“Jurisdiction for an immigration judge to review a determination . . . that an 
alien is specially dangerous shall commence with the filing by the Service of a Notice of Referral to the 
Immigration Judge . . . with the Immigration Court having jurisdiction over the place of the alien’s 
custody.”). 
 35. Id. § 241.14(h) (“The immigration judge shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine 
whether the evidence supporting the Service’s determination is sufficient to establish reasonable cause 
to go forward with a merits hearing . . . .”). 
 36. Id. § 241.14(i).  At the merits hearing, the government must prove that the alien should 
remain in custody because the alien’s release would pose a special danger to the public under the 
standards in 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1).  The regulation states that: 
In making any determination in a merits hearing . . . the immigration judge shall consider 
the following non-exclusive list of factors: 
(i)  The alien’s prior criminal history, particularly the nature and seriousness 
of any prior crimes involving violence or threats of violence; 
(ii) The alien’s previous history of recidivism, if any, upon release from either 
Service or criminal custody; 
(iii) The substantiality of the Service’s evidence regarding the alien’s current 
5
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been deemed a special danger to the public.37 
C. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the “[I]nadmissible or 
[C]riminal [A]liens” Statute 
The Court has issued two major decisions addressing the indefinite 
detention of aliens, Zadvydas v. Davis and Clark v. Martinez.  This 
subpart discusses these opinions and their practical implications. 
1. Zadvydas v. Davis 
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court addressed whether the post-
removal-period “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute authorizes 
detention of a removable alien “indefinitely beyond the removal period” 
or whether the statute authorizes detention only for the time necessary 
for the government to secure removal.38  The Court held that the statute 
“limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably 
necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.”39  
In doing so, however, the Court emphasized the statute’s ambiguity.40  
Moreover, the Court noted that it was unable to find “any clear 
indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the 
power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered removed.”41  
Finding that the language of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” 
statute was ambiguous, the Court further noted that the drafters’ 
inclusion of the word “may” suggested that discretion should be used in 
implementing the provision.42 
Despite the statute’s ambiguity, the Court chose an interpretation that 
avoided the “serious constitutional threat” of a possible due process 
mental condition or personality disorder; 
(iv) The likelihood that the alien will engage in acts of violence in the future; 
and 
(v) The nature and seriousness of the danger to the public posed by the alien’s 
release. 
Id. § 241.14(i)(2)(i)–(v). 
 37. Id. § 241.14(k). 
 38. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). 
 39. Id. at 689. 
 40. Id. at 697. 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. (“‘An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible . . . removable . . . or who has been 
determine by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of 
removal, may be detained beyond the removal period . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(6) (2006))). 
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violation.43  The Court recognized that “the Due Process Clause applies 
to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their 
presence [in the U.S.] is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”44  
Thus, the Court interpreted the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” 
statute in a manner that allowed the Court to avoid ruling on the 
provision’s constitutionality.45 
Ultimately, however, the Court’s determination that the statute does 
not allow indefinite detention implicitly accounted for due process 
requirements.46  Attempting to create uniformity in the statute’s 
administration, the Court concluded that a six-month period was 
presumptively the amount of time reasonably necessary to determine 
whether the government will be able to remove an alien.47 
2. Clark v. Martinez 
While Zadvydas addressed the indefinite detention of removable 
aliens, the Court, in Clark v. Martinez, grappled with the indefinite 
detention of inadmissible aliens not entitled to enter the U.S.48  The 
Court applied the Zadvydas construction of the “[i]nadmissible or 
criminal aliens” provision to inadmissible aliens and found that the 
statute’s crucial terminology applied—without distinction—to each of 
the three categories of aliens who were subject to it.49  The Court noted 
the ambiguities in the statute’s language and relied on the finding in 
Zadvydas that there were two plausible readings of the provision: one 
that authorized indefinite detention yet approached constitutional 
limitations, and one that authorized detention for only the amount of 
time necessary to effectuate removal.50  Further, the Court noted that the 
 43. Id. at 699. 
 44. Id. at 693.  But see Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1254 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing what process is due to an alien and how this is unclear in the courts), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1011 (2009). 
 45. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (“‘It is a cardinal principal’ of statutory interpretation . . . that 
when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain 
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 701. 
 48. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 373 (2005).  Martinez and Benitez, the detained aliens in 
this case, entered the U.S. from Cuba as part of the Mariel boatlift.  Id. at 374.  They were paroled into 
the U.S. and given the opportunity “to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resident after one 
year.”  Id.  Neither of the men qualified for the adjustment to their status, as they had become 
inadmissible due to prior criminal convictions in the U.S.  Id.  As a result, they were detained and 
ordered removed to Cuba.  Id. at 375. 
 49. Id. at 378. 
 50. Id. at 384. 
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Zadvydas decision relied on both statutory ambiguity and constitutional 
avoidance.51  Martinez emphasized the necessity of consistency when 
interpreting the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute and left no 
available justifications for allowing the same detention provision to have 
different meanings depending on an alien’s classification.52 
D. Agency Construction of a Statute 
Despite the Court’s unambiguous holding regarding the indefinite 
detention of inadmissible or removable aliens, administrative law 
principles establish that government agencies have discretion in 
construing statutes when deciding certain types of cases.  The Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of conflicting statutory interpretations between 
the judiciary and an agency in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. and National Cable and Telecommunications 
Association v. Brand X Internet Services.53  The Court’s decisions in 
these cases establishes that courts should defer to an agency’s 
construction of an ambiguous statute—even if the agency’s construction 
conflicts with a prior judicial construction—so long as the construction 
is reasonable.54  In accordance with this discretion, administrative law 
courts have reached different conclusions regarding the indefinite 
detention of “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens.”55 
In Chevron the Court established a two-part test to determine when 
courts must give deference to “an agency’s construction of a statute that 
it administers.”56  Chevron deference is due when “the [pertinent] statute 
is silent or ambiguous” on the issue in question and when the agency’s 
construction is “a permissible construction of the statute.”57  Further 
clarifying the Chevron decision, the Court in Brand X ruled that a “prior 
judicial construction of a statute trumps [a subsequent] agency 
 51. Id. at 379; see also id. at 381 (noting that the canon of constitutional avoidance “allows 
courts to avoid the decision of constitutional questions” and “ is a tool for choosing between competing 
plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not 
intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”). 
 52. Id. at 380. 
 53. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1011 (2009); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
 54. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244. 
 55. See id. at 1252. 
 56. Id.; see also J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod 
to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 41–46 (2010) (discussing the Chevron “two-step doctrine”). 
 57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Robin Kundis Craig, Administrative Law in the Roberts 
Court: The First Four Years, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 69, 144–46 (2010). 
8
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/6
J-CASSIDY 9/4/2011  1:23:44 PM 
2011] INDEFINITE DETENTION OF ALIENS 1525 
 
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous 
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”58 
In Chevron, the Court did not create its own construction of the 
statute in question but instead simply addressed whether the agency’s 
construction was permissible.59  The Court decided the proper standard 
of review to be applied to a government agency’s interpretation of a 
statute and discussed ambiguities within statutory text.60  The Court 
ruled that an agency’s jurisdiction to administer a statute includes the 
“authority . . . to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable fashion.”61  
Furthermore, the Court remarked that the judiciary may not impose its 
own interpretation of a statute in lieu of an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation.62 
In Brand X, the Court addressed whether the Ninth Circuit’s prior 
construction of the Communications Act barred a subsequent 
interpretation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).63  
The Court applied the Chevron framework to the FCC’s interpretation of 
the Communications Act, concluding that “[i]f a statute is 
ambiguous . . . and if the implementing agency’s construction is 
reasonable,” the court must, in accordance with Chevron, defer to the 
agency’s construction “even if the agency’s reading differs from what 
the court believes is the best . . . interpretation.”64  The Court further 
noted that the question of “whether Congress has delegated to an agency 
the authority to interpret a statute” depends on whether the provision at 
issue meets the requirements of Chevron.65  This delegation of authority 
does not, however, depend on the temporal sequence of “the judicial and 
administrative constructions.”66 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The issue is relatively straightforward: whether the “[i]nadmissible or 
criminal aliens” statute permits the continued detention of certain 
classifications of removable aliens beyond the statutory removal period.  
In answering this question, the circuits must decide which interpretation 
 58. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 982 (emphasis added). 
 59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 980 (describing the holding of Chevron). 
 62. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 63. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 982. 
 64. Id. at 980. 
 65. Id. at 983. 
 66. Id. 
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of the statute is superior—the Supreme Court’s narrow construction in 
Zadvydas or the Attorney General’s broad construction in line with the 
“special circumstances” regulation and the Supreme Court’s Chevron 
and Brand X rulings.  This Part examines the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits’ various constructions of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” 
statute. 
A. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ Interpretation: Thai v. Ashcroft and 
Tran v. Mukasey 
According to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Attorney General’s 
broad construction is impermissible.  In Thai v. Ashcroft, for example, 
the Ninth Circuit examined whether the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute authorized the 
continued detention of a removable alien based upon the Attorney 
General’s finding that the alien was “specially dangerous” to the 
community because of mental illness.67  In affirming the lower court’s 
grant of Tuan Thai’s habeas corpus petition, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the Supreme Court’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal 
aliens” statute prohibited Thai’s continued detention, despite the 
presence of circumstances that put community safety at risk.68 
Thai entered the U.S. from Vietnam as a lawful permanent resident,69 
but subsequently established a criminal record with “convictions for 
assault, harassment, and third-degree rape.”70  After serving sentences 
for these crimes, Thai was taken into government custody so that 
removal proceedings could begin, with the goal of sending Thai back to 
Vietnam.71  An immigration judge found that Thai was removable, but 
Vietnamese government officials were uncooperative in providing travel 
documents, thereby rendering Thai’s removal “not reasonably 
foreseeable.”72  Thai challenged his continued detention by filing a 
habeas corpus petition,73 which was granted by the district court.74  The 
 67. Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 68. Id. at 792. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2010).  This statute describes the “[p]ower to grant [the] writ” 
of habeas corpus, and states: 
(a)  Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, 
the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.  The 
order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the 
district wherein the restraint complained of is had. 
10
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government appealed the district court’s order, initiated continued 
detention proceedings pursuant to the “special circumstances” 
regulation,75 and established what the immigration judge viewed as 
“clear and convincing evidence that Thai’s release would pose a special 
danger to the public.”76 
Despite evidence of Thai’s mental instability and violent tendencies, 
the Ninth Circuit interpreted Zadvydas to establish that the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute was a bar to “post-removal-
period detention of an alien once removal [was] no longer reasonably 
foreseeable.”77  Because it was undisputed that Thai’s removal was “not 
reasonably foreseeable,” the court determined that Thai’s continued 
detention was impermissible under Supreme Court precedent.78 
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument 
that Thai’s continued detention was authorized under both Zadvydas and 
the “special circumstances” provision.79  The government asserted that 
Zadvydas established an exception to the six-month presumption for 
“specially dangerous” individuals and further contended that the “special 
circumstances” regulation was articulated in light of this Zadvydas 
exception.80  According to the Ninth Circuit, however, Zadvydas did not 
intend to create a class of aliens whose detention would not be subject to 
(b)  The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to 
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the 
application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction 
to entertain it. 
(c)  The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless— 
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or 
is committed for trial before some court thereof; or 
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of 
Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of 
the United States; or 
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States; or 
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody 
for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, 
privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order 
or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and 
effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or 
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial. 
Id. 
 74. Thai, 366 F.3d at 792–93. 
 75. Id. at 793; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) (2010). 
 76. Thai, 366 F.3d at 793. 
 77. Id. at 798. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 794–98. 
 80. Id. at 794. 
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limitation.81  According to the Ninth Circuit, Zadvydas explicated 
situations where the ninety-day rule may be inappropriate and detention 
for the presumptive period of six months would instead be permissible.82 
In response to the post-Zadvydas enactment of the “special 
circumstances” provision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney 
General’s regulation was invalid because it allowed the government to 
take actions prohibited under the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” 
statute.83  The court relied solely on the narrow Zadvydas construction 
of the statute in reaching its decision, reasoning that because the “special 
circumstances” regulation was in conflict with the statute, the statute 
must control.84  The court determined that the limitations on the statute 
established in Zadvydas should apply to Thai’s case as well.85  Though 
the court distinguished Thai from the habeas petitioner in Zadvydas by 
noting the presence of Thai’s “ill mental health” coupled with 
dangerousness, the court refused to permit Thai’s indefinite detention on 
account of this additional mental instability.86  In its ruling, the Ninth 
Circuit failed to comment on the ambiguity of the “[i]nadmissible or 
criminal aliens” provision as well as the administrative deference 
imposed by Chevron and Brand X.87 
In Tran v. Mukasey, the Fifth Circuit also addressed whether the 
Zadvydas construction of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute 
authorized continued detention of removable aliens when the 
government has determined that the alien’s mental illness renders him a 
danger to the community.88  The Tran court reasoned that it was “bound 
by the statutory construction put forward” in Zadvydays and Martinez89 
and construed the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute narrowly.90  
 81. See id. at 794–98. 
 82. Id. at 795 (“The statement in Zadvydas that noncriminal detention by the Government is 
permissible only in narrow nonpunitive circumstances was intended to illustrate what the Government is 
generally prohibited from doing, and what it may in some circumstances be permitted to do. It did not 
state what the Government is authorized to do under § 1231(a)(6).”). 
 83. See id. at 798–99. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 798. 
 86. See id. (The court does “not believe that Zadvydas can properly be read to prohibit the 
indefinite detention of dangerous resident aliens like Ma, while allowing the indefinite detention of 
dangerous resident aliens like Thai.  An alien’s ill mental health coupled with dangerousness cannot 
justify indefinite detention under Zadvydas when dangerousness alone cannot justify such detention.”). 
 87. See id. at 790. 
 88. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 89. Id. at 484; see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (“It is [the 
Supreme Court’s] responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the 
duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.”). 
 90. See Tran, 515 F.3d 478. 
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The court ruled that the alien’s indefinite detention was impermissible.91 
The alien in this case, Ha Tran, was a Vietnamese citizen admitted to 
the U.S. as a refugee and was later granted the status of a lawful 
permanent resident.92  After criminal convictions for firearm possession 
as well as assault and battery against his wife, Tran was confined to a 
mental hospital for two years, diagnosed with mental illness, and 
transferred to a halfway house.93  Upon his release, Tran murdered his 
wife.94  He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to prison.95 
During his second incarceration, DHS took custody of Tran and 
initiated deportation proceedings.96  After it became clear that his 
removal from the U.S. was “not reasonably foreseeable,” Tran filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus to terminate his detention.97  The 
government argued that the district court erred in granting Tran’s habeas 
petition by following Zadvydas and that the court instead should have 
deferred, as required under Chevron, to the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute.98  The 
Fifth Circuit, however, declined to give Chevron deference to the 
Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute and instead found that 
Zadvydas resolved the “ambiguity by imposing a requirement 
that . . . detention last no longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate 
removal.”99  Thus, the Tran court concluded that the government’s 
interpretation of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute was 
impermissible and not due Chevron deference because Zadvydas 
removed any ambiguity in the statute’s meaning.100 
 
 91. Id. at 479. 
 92. Id. at 480. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 480. 
 97. Id. at 481.  Tran was being detained under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) after he was taken into 
custody by DHS during his manslaughter sentence.  Id. at 480.  DHS decided to continue custody based 
upon a finding that Tran’s mental illness would cause him to commit acts of violence in the future 
despite the acknowledgment that Tran was unlikely to be removed in the foreseeable future.  Id.  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals later found that the Government had established by clear and convincing 
evidence that Tran had met the criteria for continued detention under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f).  Id. at 480–
81. 
 98. Id. at 481, 484. 
 99. Id. at 484. 
 100. Id. 
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B. The Tenth Circuit: Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson 
In Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, the Tenth Circuit addressed 
whether the Attorney General’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible or 
criminal aliens” statute required deference in light of the Supreme 
Court’s contrary interpretation of the statute in Zadvydas and 
Martinez.101  The Hernandez-Carrera court used a two-part analysis in 
addressing the issue, first asking “whether ‘the statute [was] silent or 
ambiguous’” with regards to the authority of the Attorney General to 
detain specific classes of aliens past the “removal period,” and second 
asking whether the Attorney General’s construction was acceptable.102  
The court addressed these questions in light of Chevron and Brand X, 
and concluded that the Attorney General’s “subsequent, reasonable . . . 
interpretation of [the] ambiguous statute” did not raise constitutional 
questions and was therefore entitled to judicial deference.103 
The petitioners in this case, Santos Hernandez-Carrera and Pablo 
Santiago Hernandez-Arenado, were native citizens of Cuba who entered 
the U.S. illegally during the 1980 Mariel boatlift.104  Classified as 
inadmissible aliens, both men were granted immigration parole in the 
U.S.105  After criminal convictions, the government revoked parole, and 
the men were issued exclusion and deportation orders, based upon each 
man’s “lack of entry documents and convictions for crimes of moral 
turpitude.”106  After the final orders of removal were issued, 
immigration judges, pursuant to the “special circumstances” regulation, 
ordered the continued detention of both men because of their criminal 
records and the poor results of their mental health eva 107
Hernandez-Carrera had an exhaustive criminal history, including 
convictions for rape with force and bodily injury, battery, and indecent 
exposure.108  After his incarceration, Hernandez-Carrera was detained, 
taken into custody by the INS and diagnosed with schizophrenia.109  He 
refused to take medication for his illness, and assessments by mental 
health experts concluded that Hernandez-Carrera “would be a direct 
danger to the public” and “quite likely” to engage in future violence if 
 101. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1011 (2009). 
 102. Id. at 1244–45. 
 103. Id. at 1242. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1242–44. 
 108. Id. at 1243. 
 109. Id. 
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released from detention.110  Accordingly, an immigration judge 
concluded that there were “no reasonable conditions of release” that 
could be imposed on Hernandez-Carrera to “ensure public safety.”111 
The immigration court similarly deemed Hernandez-Arenado a 
danger to the public because of his mental illness and criminal  
history.112  Hernandez-Arenado “admitted to involvement in ‘several 
hundred’ pedophilic contacts with children in Cuba and in the United 
States” and was taken into INS custody after being imprisoned for the 
sexual assault of a seven-year-old boy.113  During his detention, 
Hernandez-Arenado was diagnosed with mental illness, in this case 
pedophilia.114  Subsequent evaluations determined that Hernandez-
Arenado could not be released from detention without exposing the 
public to danger.115  Mental health experts concluded that he was 
unlikely to change his behavior or cease to act on his impulses, 
especially given the fact that Hernandez-Arenado stated several times 
that “he [did] not believe [that] sex with children [was] wrong.”116  An 
immigration judge agreed with these mental health evaluations and 
noted that if Hernandez-Arenado was released from detention, nothing 
would prevent him from molesting more children.117  Thus, as in the 
case of Hernandez-Carrera, the judge ruled that “no reasonable 
conditions of release [could] reasonably be expected to ensure the safety 
of the public.”118 
Both Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-Arenado filed petitions for 
writs of habeas corpus, alleging that their continued detention was 
unconstitutional.119  Given that they were diagnosed with “harm-
threatening mental illness[es] and [were] likely to engage in violent 
behavior if released such that public safety [could not] reasonably be 
guaranteed,” the district court addressed whether it was constitutionally 
permissible for the Attorney General to continue detention “beyond the 
presumptive six month post-removal detention period” despite the fact 
that removal was “not reasonably foreseeable.”120  The district court, 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1243. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1186 (D. Kan. 2008), vacated and 
remanded by 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009). 
 120. Id. at 1189. 
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like the lower courts in Thai and Tran, found that the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of the “special circumstances” regulation was not 
permitted under the Supreme Court’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible 
or criminal aliens” statute.121  Consequently, the district court concluded 
that Zadvydas and Martinez explicated settled law on the issue and 
granted writs to both petitioners.122 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the Attorney 
General’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute, 
as articulated through the “special circumstances” regulation, should be 
given deference in spite of the Supreme Court’s contrary constructions 
in Zadvydas and Martinez.123  The court used a three-part analysis to 
reach its decision. 
1. Whether the “Inadmissible or Criminal Aliens” Statute Was Silent or 
Ambiguous 
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis with a finding that the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute was ambiguous.  According to 
the court, its conclusion was supported by two separate Supreme Court 
decisions finding the statute ambiguous.124  The Tenth Circuit relied on 
the Court’s statement in Zadvydas that it was unable to find “‘any clear 
indication’” that Congress intended the Attorney General to have the 
power to indefinitely detain “‘an alien ordered removed.’”125  The Tenth 
Circuit also cited the Court’s finding in Martinez “that the Zadvydas 
Court ‘rel[ied] on ambiguities in the statutory text’ of § 1231(a)(6) when 
construing the statute.”126 
As further evidence of the statute’s ambiguity, the Tenth Circuit 
emphasized the Court’s application of constitutional avoidance in 
Zadvydas and Martinez.127  The Supreme Court remarked in Martinez 
that the canon should be invoked when, “after the application of 
ordinary textual analysis, [a] statute is found to be susceptible of more 
than one construction.”128  Conversely, the canon is inapplicable in 
statutory interpretation if congressional intent is clear.129  The Tenth 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1186. 
 123. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244. 
 124. Id. at 1245. 
 125. Id. (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001)). 
 126. Id. (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005)). 
 127. Id. at 1244. 
 128. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005). 
 129. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1245. 
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Circuit reasoned that because the Supreme Court exercised the canon in 
two decisions addressing the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” 
provision, it was clear that the Court viewed “the statute as genuinely 
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.”130 
2. Whether the Attorney General’s Construction Was Permissible 
The Tenth Circuit characterized the second part of its analysis as the 
“more serious question,” and further divided the issue into three separate 
inquiries.131 
a. Whether Brand X Applies to the Supreme Court’s Statutory 
Interpretations 
In its initial inquiry, the Hernandez-Carrera court concluded that the 
Attorney General’s construction of the statute was owed Chevron 
deference to the extent that it was reasonable.132  The Tenth Circuit 
evaluated the reasonableness of the Attorney General’s construction by 
first addressing the role of judicial deference to administrative 
interpretations of a statute.133  The court noted that deference is not 
simply a policy choice but instead “a means of giving effect to 
congressional intent.”134  As such, when Congress creates an agency-
administered statute that is filled with gaps, it is, by implication, 
entrusting the agency to fill in the missing pieces that are necessary for a 
practical application of the statute.135  Further, the court inferred that 
because Congress specifically authorized the Attorney General to create 
rules concerning the detention of aliens ordered removed, Congress 
thereby delegated authority to the Attorney General to address existing 
ambiguities in the statute it was charged with enforcing.136  The court 
concluded that if it were to favor the judiciary’s interpretation “over a 
reasonable administrative agency construction,” the court “would be 
ignoring Congress’s choice to empower an agency, rather than the 
courts, to resolve this kind of statutory ambiguity.”137 
The Tenth Circuit also addressed Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 1245–46. 
 132. Id. at 1246. 
 133. Id. at 1246. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
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Arenado’s argument that the rule established in Brand X could only be 
applied to lower court decisions, not to Supreme Court decisions.138  
The Brand X decision addressed a Ninth Circuit statutory construction, 
but the Tenth Circuit ultimately disagreed with the aliens’ argument and 
applied Brand X to interpretations made by both the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts.139  The court extended the Brand X rule upon the 
premise that agency deference in both lower court and Supreme Court 
decisions gives necessary “weight to Congress’[s] intent to vest an 
agency with the power to” be a statutory gap filler.140 
Additionally, the court noted that if Brand X were applied only to 
lower court decisions, the timing of the Supreme Court’s construction of 
a statute would determine whether an agency interpretation could be 
given deference.141  That is, if an agency interpretation occurred 
subsequent to a Supreme Court construction, the agency would not be 
given deference and would also be precluded “from revising unwise 
judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes” in the future.142  Further, 
the court emphasized that limiting application of Brand X to lower court 
decisions would disregard the central premise of both Chevron and 
Brand X, namely that Congress intended “for agencies, not courts, to fill 
statutory gaps.”143 
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that its application of the Brand X 
rule to Supreme Court statutory interpretations would conflict with the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Tran v. Mukasey and the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Thai v. Ashcroft.144  As discussed in subpart III.A, the courts 
in both cases based their rulings on the proposition that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Zadvydas was a definitive interpretation of the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute.145  The Tenth Circuit, 
however, disagreed that Zadvydas was the final word on the issue and 
instead concluded that under Brand X an agency may, after a judicial 
interpretation has been rendered, choose a disparate statutory 
 138. See id. at 1246–47; Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction 
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). 
 139. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1246–48. 
 140. Id. at 1247. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 983 
(1984)). 
 144. Id. at 1248; Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008); Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
 145. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1248. 
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construction because the agency is the interpreter of the statute within 
reasonable limits.146  Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, Tran and 
Thai should have addressed whether the Attorney General’s construction 
of the statute was reasonable, not whether Zadvydas authorized the 
indefinite detention protested by the aliens.147  The Tenth Circuit 
concluded that Zadvydas was not a resolution of the statutory ambiguity 
of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” provision but instead it was a 
refusal by the Court to defer to the unreasonable and constitutionally-
flawed agency interpretation.148  According to the Tenth Circuit, 
Zadvydas did not establish that the Court’s construction was the only 
reasonable construction possible.149 
b. Whether Deference to the Attorney General’s Interpretation Is 
Precluded by Constitutional Avoidance 
The Tenth Circuit’s next step in its analysis discussed the canon of 
constitutional avoidance and its interplay with principles of 
administrative deference.150  The court concluded that an agency may 
interpret a statute in a reasonable and constitutionally permissible 
manner, despite the fact that another court has already construed the 
same statute within the confines of the Constitution.151 
Under the canon of constitutional avoidance, a court must construe a 
statute in a way that avoids “‘serious constitutional problems’” when 
“‘an otherwise acceptable construction of [the] statute’” would raise 
these issues.152  Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-Arenado argued that 
the canon should transcend Chevron deference and should therefore 
preclude the court’s acceptance of the Attorney General’s “special 
circumstances” regulation.153  The government, in response, argued that 
when Chevron deference to an agency interpretation is appropriate, such 
deference should not be precluded by constitutional avoidance.154  The 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1249. 
 149. Id. (“In no way, however, did the Court signal that its interpretation was the only reasonable 
construction of § 1231(a)(6).  To the contrary, the Court specifically found the statute to be ambiguous.  
Moreover, the Court explicitly recognized that its construction of the statute was not the only reasonable 
one possible.” (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697, 701 (2001)). 
 150. See id. at 1249–51. 
 151. Id. at 1251. 
 152. Id. at 1249 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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Tenth Circuit relied upon the established principle “that the canon of 
constitutional avoidance does constrain an agency’s discretion to 
interpret statutory ambiguities, even when Chevron deference would 
otherwise be due,”155 and found a middle ground between each side’s 
arguments.156  The court concluded that constitutional avoidance may 
bar an agency construction that raises “substantial constitutional 
doubts,” although the Attorney General’s construction of the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute, promulgated through the 
“special circumstances” provision, did not create such uncertainty.157 
The court then addressed the interplay between Chevron deference 
and the constitutional avoidance canon in emphasizing that Chevron 
indicated “that Congress generally intends to empower an agency to 
resolve certain statutory ambiguities,” while the canon of constitutional 
avoidance implies that Congress does not typically intend to authorize 
agencies to fill in statutory gaps in a manner that evokes “substantial 
constitutional doubts.”158  In a situation involving an ambiguous statute 
with the resulting possibility of multiple interpretations that each avoid 
constitutional doubts, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that one court’s 
construction does not foreclose the administering agency from adopting 
a different yet reasonable interpretation so long as constitutional 
concerns are avoided.159  Further, the court ruled that an agency may 
reinterpret a statute in a way that differs from the agency’s previous 
construction.160  So long as reinterpretation avoids constitutional doubts, 
it will be given Chevron deference161 even if it conflicts with an 
intermediate judicial construction of the statute that also applied the 
avoidance canon.162 
c. Whether the Attorney General’s Construction Raises “Serious 
Constitutional Doubts” 
In the final step of its analysis, the Tenth Circuit discussed the 
substantive and procedural requirements of the “special circumstances” 
regulation.163  The court concluded that the Attorney General’s 
 155. Id. (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. at 1249. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1250. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1251. 
 161. Id. (noting that the reinterpretation should be given deference “to the extent that would 
otherwise be appropriate under the Chevron framework”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1251–56. 
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construction of the statute, as revised under Zadvydas, no longer raised 
“serious constitutional doubts” because it contained “substantive 
limitations built into the [agency’s] power to detain aliens beyond the 
removal period” and provided “procedural protections . . . sufficient to 
satisfy due process.”164 
The Attorney General’s original interpretation of the statute, at issue 
in Zadvydas, was overbroad because it permitted the indefinite detention 
of all removable aliens covered by the “[i]nadmissible or criminal 
aliens” statute, notwithstanding the alien’s dangerousness or special 
circumstances.165  That construction was also procedurally deficient 
because it included, among other things, a presumption of the alien’s 
dangerousness, which the alien had the burden of disproving.166  If 
unable to meet this burden, the alien was subject to indefinite 
detention.167 
The Attorney General’s revised construction of the statute was drafted 
in consideration of the Supreme Court’s remark in Zadvydas that when 
detention of an alien “is of potentially indefinite duration, [the Court 
has] also demanded that the dangerousness rationale be accompanied by 
some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to 
create the danger.”168  Under the Attorney General’s revised regulation, 
the indefinite detention of an alien ordered removed requires the 
government to follow specific procedural protocol, including a showing 
that the alien is dangerous and that there are additional special 
circumstances present.169 
Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-Arenado made several objections 
to the “special circumstances” regulation, but the Tenth Circuit found 
the provision reasonable and the aliens’ objections unfounded.170  
Significantly, the aliens argued that the Attorney General’s regulation 
did not satisfy their right to due process.171  The Tenth Circuit, however, 
disagreed and noted that it was unclear whether aliens are entitled to the 
same due process rights as citizens or lawful permanent residents.172  
 164. Id. at 1251 (emphasis added). 
 165. See id. at 1252. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id.; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691 (2001). 
 168. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see also Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1253. 
 169. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1253–54; 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(a)–(k) (2010). 
 170. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1254–56. 
 171. See id. at 1254. 
 172. See id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) (“The fact that all persons, aliens and 
citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all 
aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship, or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens 
must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification.”)). 
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The aliens also objected to the evidence standard imposed by the 
“special circumstances” regulation, which requires the government to 
prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that an alien is dangerous.173  
Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-Arenado argued that the evidentiary 
standard should be heightened to a standard requiring the government to 
show dangerousness “beyond a reasonable doubt.”174  The court again 
disagreed, reasoning that the “clear and convincing evidence” standard 
was sufficient because the Supreme Court had previously upheld this 
same standard in a case involving an indefinite civil commitment 
proceeding.175 
In light of its judgment that the Attorney General’s construction of the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute was reasonable and that the 
construction avoided serious constitutional questions, the Tenth Circuit 
denied the aliens’ habeas corpus petitions and gave Chevron deference 
to the Attorney General’s statutory interpretation.176 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS 
The current state of immigration law regarding the indefinite 
detention of removable aliens deemed both dangerous and mentally ill is 
problematic in light of the fact that the circuit courts are split on the 
permissibility of this narrow class of aliens’ indefinite detention.177  This 
Part discusses why the Tenth Circuit’s understanding of the relevant 
statute is superior to that of the other circuits.  This Part also suggests 
potential future governmental actions in order to promote clarity, 
uniformity, and humanity in federal immigration law. 
 
 173. See id. at 1254; 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(i), (l) (2010). 
 174. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1254. 
 175. Id.  The Hernandez-Carrera court remarked that Addington “noted that given the 
uncertainties of psychological diagnosis, a reasonable doubt standard might ‘impose a burden that the 
state cannot meet,’ and that a clear and convincing evidence standard was sufficient to satisfy due 
process.”  Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979)).  The Tenth Circuit reasoned that a 
higher standard was not “constitutionally compelled in the context of aliens subject to exclusion and 
deportation orders.”  Id. 
 176. Id. at 1256. 
 177. See supra Part III.  Compare Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008), and Thai v. 
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding impermissible the indefinite detention of an alien 
ordered removed who the government finds dangerous because of mental illness), with Hernandez-
Carrera, 547 F.3d 1237 (upholding the Attorney General’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and 
allowing indefinite detention in specific limited circumstances). 
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A. The Tenth Circuit’s Understanding of the Statute Is Superior 
The Tenth Circuit permitted the government to impose indefinite 
detention on removable aliens who were both dangerous and mentally 
ill,178 and adopted a preferable reading of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal 
aliens” statute.  The Tenth Circuit’s opinion accounted for a variety of 
overlapping considerations, including the ambiguity of the statute, the 
constitutionality of the Attorney General’s construction, principles of 
agency deference, and overall policy objectives.179 
Under Chevron and Brand X, a court may defer to an agency’s 
construction of an ambiguous statute so long as the construction is 
reasonable.180  In the context of immigration law, the Supreme Court has 
previously remanded cases involving interpretation of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act to lower administrative courts, because, 
comparatively speaking, the executive branch has more expertise in 
foreign relations issues and because gaps in a statute are best filled by 
the administering agency.181  The Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
Hernandez-Carrera recognizes the proper roles of Chevron and Brand X 
in guiding judicial deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation.  The 
Tenth Circuit adhered to the theory behind Brand X when it concluded 
that Congress had charged the Attorney General with administering the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute, and therefore, the Tenth 
Circuit correctly determined that the Attorney General was best-
equipped to deal with statutory ambiguities.182 
Further, the Tenth Circuit’s reading of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal 
aliens” statute was superior because the court gave Chevron deference to 
the Attorney General’s “special circumstances” regulation.  The “special 
circumstances” regulation is a reasonable construction of the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute because, unlike the broad 
construction advocated by the government in Zadvydas, this revised 
regulation has a narrow substantive reach.183  Notably, the provision 
applies only to a limited class of aliens who are both dangerous and 
mentally ill.184  The evidentiary standards mandated under the regulation 
require the government to prove an alien’s dangerousness and mental 
 178. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d 1237. 
 179. See id.; supra Part III.B. 
 180. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); see also Craig, supra note 
57, at 144. 
 181. See Craig, supra note 57, at 184–85. 
 182. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1246; Craig, supra note 57, at 173–74. 
 183. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1251–56; see also supra Part III.B. 
 184. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1252–53; 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) (2010). 
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illness by clear and convincing evidence.185  This is a distinct change 
from the Attorney General’s regulation in Zadvydas, which created a 
presumption of an alien’s dangerousness that the alien was required to 
disprove.186  Additionally, the procedural safeguards under the “special 
circumstances” provision satisfy due process and provide for continuous 
agency review of the alien’s case.187 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of the statute, discussed 
in Tran and Thai, respectively, incorrectly applied the law.  Both circuits 
failed to consider recognized principles of administrative law, and 
instead, focused solely on Zadvydas.188  In Chevron and Brand X, the 
Supreme Court determined that an agency’s reading of a statute must be 
permitted if the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable.189  Accordingly, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits should have 
abided by this precedent and addressed whether the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” provision was a 
reasonable way to construe the ambiguous statute.190  The circuits failed 
to do this and instead reached decisions that did not take into account the 
legal principles established in Chevron and Brand X.  The Tenth Circuit, 
on the other hand, provided a complete analysis of both the 
administrative and immigration concerns at issue, and its statutory 
construction stands on a solid foundation that melds two branches of the 
law and creates a cohesive, practical rule regarding the indefinite 
detention of aliens ordered removed. 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision is also preferable because, in accepting 
the Attorney General’s construction, the court acknowledged the need to 
strike a feasible balance between public safety concerns and due process 
rights for removable aliens.  The numerous procedural steps required to 
indefinitely detain an alien under the “special circumstances” regulation 
provide the necessary balance.191  The Supreme Court also 
acknowledged the necessity of this balance, noting in Zadvydas that 
although ensuring public safety was a serious concern, deprivation of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights was also sure to occur as a result of 
 185. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(i), (1) (2010). 
 186. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1252; see also supra notes 163–168 and accompanying 
text. 
 187. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1251; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(k) (2010). 
 188. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1248–49; Marquez-Coromina v. Hollingsworth, 692 F. 
Supp. 2d 565, 572–74 (D. Md. 2010). 
 189. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 190. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1248–49; see also Marquez-Coromina, 692 F. Supp. 2d 
at 572–74. 
 191. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244–57. 
24
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/6
J-CASSIDY 9/4/2011  1:23:44 PM 
2011] INDEFINITE DETENTION OF ALIENS 1541 
 
the Attorney General’s previous broad construction of the 
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute.192  Further, the public safety 
concern is especially significant given the extreme nature of danger 
posed by some alien detainees.193  If the Tenth Circuit had followed the 
same reasoning used by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, then removable 
alien Hernandez-Arenado, an admitted pedophile, would have been 
released from detention after his habeas petition was granted.  Such 
release would have granted him the freedom and opportunity to 
victimize more young boys, which is especially frightening because 
Hernandez-Arenado has said that he does not believe that sex with 
children is wrong.194  As a result of the Tenth Circuit’s decision, 
however, Hernandez-Arenado’s habeas corpus petition was denied, and 
he will not have access to children, thus protecting public safety while 
also providing due process to the detained alien.  Because the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision strikes the necessary balance between public safety 
and due process, the court’s reading of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal 
aliens” statute is superior. 
The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are currently the only circuit 
courts to address this issue.  Notably, however, the District of Maryland, 
located within the Fourth Circuit, was recently presented with a case, 
Marquez-Coromina v. Hollingsworth, that was nearly identical to 
Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson.195  In Marquez-Coromina v. 
Hollingsworth, an alien who objected to indefinite detention and sought 
a habeas corpus petition had a history of violent criminal behavior, was 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, and refused treatment for his 
mental illness.196  The district court found the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning 
in Hernandez-Carrera persuasive and, accordingly, denied the alien’s 
habeas petition.197  The court concluded that the Tenth Circuit’s decision 
was consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent regarding similar issues198 
and that the Attorney General’s “special circumstances” regulation 
raised no due process concerns.199  In light of the district court’s 
 192. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001); see also Pages, supra note 24, at 1234–35 
(addressing the societal implications of Zadvydas and the concern for public safety). 
 193. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1243–44 (describing Hernandez-Carrera’s history of 
committing crimes of violence and sexual assault, and describing Hernandez-Arenado’s admitted 
pedophilia); see also Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing Tran’s convictions 
for the assault, battery, and murder of his wife in front of his seven year old daughter). 
 194. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1243. 
 195. See Marquez-Coromina, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 566–68. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. at 573–74. 
 198. Id. at 574 (citing Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2007); Elm Grove 
Coal Co. v. Dir., O.W.C.P., 480 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
 199. See id. 
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adoption of the Tenth Circuit’s position, other federal courts may follow 
the Tenth Circuit’s example. 
B. Future Action for the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches 
Each branch of government should take action to remedy inconsistent 
application of federal law on the indefinite detention issue.  
Interpretation of federal immigration statutes can vary greatly among the 
circuit courts, as evidenced by the immigration decisions discussed in 
this Comment.  The geographic location of an alien at the time of 
detainment can have as much influence on the outcome of the case as 
the factual and legal issues presented to the court.200  The variability in 
judicial interpretation of the INA results in a lack of uniformity in the 
application and practice of federal immigration law.201  This is 
problematic because federal law governs the United States as a whole 
and should, accordingly, be applied consistently, regardless of the 
jurisdiction in which an alien is detained.202 
Given the sheer size of immigration courts’ caseload, as well as the 
large number of agencies involved in administering and enforcing 
federal immigration statutes, it is difficult to conceive a comprehensive 
remedy for the overall lack of uniformity in INA interpretation.203  The 
specific issue of permitting indefinite detention of removable aliens who 
are “specially dangerous” is, however, narrow enough to warrant 
significant legal alterations that would promote standardized practices in 
determining whether indefinite detention is appropriate.  It is unlikely 
that all of the circuit courts will adopt the Tenth Circuit’s position that 
the Attorney General’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal 
aliens” statute is reasonable and due deference under Chevron and 
Brand X, so this issue is appropriate for the Supreme Court review.  The 
Court should issue a ruling on this narrow question to provide a superior 
judicial precedent and create consistency in the practical application of 
the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute. 
Congress must also take appropriate action to promote uniformity in 
the INA.  Congress should amend the current “[i]nadmissible or criminal 
aliens” statute so that the provision’s language clearly reflects 
 200. See Paige Taylor, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Survey of Selected Fifth Circuit 
Immigration Cases, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 989, 990 (2009) (“[W]here one practices could have severe 
implications on the availability of relief . . . .”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 18–24. 
26
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/6
J-CASSIDY 9/4/2011  1:23:44 PM 
2011] INDEFINITE DETENTION OF ALIENS 1543 
 
Congress’s intended meaning.204  Such an amendment would eliminate 
the statute’s ambiguity and, as a result, eliminate the necessity of the 
Attorney General’s “special circumstances” regulation.  A potential 
drawback to this solution is that an amended statute may prove too broad 
in application and could still be read to permit the indefinite detention of 
aliens who do not meet the requirements for both dangerousness and 
mental illness.  An alternative, and potentially narrower, solution would 
arise if Congress “enact[s] a statute that explicitly allows for federal 
civil commitment of aliens who pose a danger to the community due to 
their mental conditions.”205  This hypothetical statute should be based 
upon the “special circumstances” regulation and ideally should codify 
the protocol used by the Attorney General when hearing cases regarding 
indefinite detention of “specially dangerous” aliens.206 
The executive branch should also remedy the potential for human 
rights violations that arise when dealing with the indefinite detention of 
aliens.207  The Attorney General’s stringent requirements in the “special 
circumstances” regulation provide procedures to determine whether an 
alien ordered removed should be detained indefinitely.208  The 
regulation does not, however, offer any procedures beyond ongoing 
periodic review of a detainee’s case.209  When an immigration judge 
finds that an indefinitely detained removable alien does not qualify for 
supervised release, the Attorney General’s federal regulation provides 
no further guidance for handling the detainee’s case.210  In light of the 
fact that indefinite detained aliens are unlikely to be removed from the 
U.S. in the foreseeable future, the Attorney General must create 
additional regulations that terminate immigration proceedings and 
provide involuntary civil commitment hearings for indefinitely detained 
 204. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001) (noting that congressional intent is 
unclear). 
 205. Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 206. See Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting the importance of public 
safety, recognizing “that in a similar circumstance where public safety was also of great concern, 
Congress took prompt action to address the issue.  In particular, in the field of national security, 
Congress enacted the Patriot Act which authorizes detention beyond the removal period of any alien 
whose removal is not foreseeable . . . if the alien presents a nation security threat,” and concluding that 
“Congress has shown that it has the authority and willingness to address these concerns”). 
 207. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 71–81. 
 208. See Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1011 (2009). 
 209. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 79–80; 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(k) (2010). 
 210. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 79–80 (noting an immigration judge’s finding 
that “no statutory or regulatory authority exists which would allow an immigration judge to terminate a 
federal immigration proceeding by ordering the transfer of custody of the alien into the jurisdictional 
control of the State of residence in order for an involuntary civil commitment to a mental health 
facility”). 
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“specially dangerous” aliens.211  During involuntary civil commitment 
hearings, qualified appointed counsel should represent the alien and 
serve as an advocate for the detainee.212  If it is established that the alien 
requires psychiatric care, then the alien should be transferred to a 
psychiatric facility.213  The facility’s treatment goals should be 
improved functioning and rehabilitation, not permanent dete 214
Although this additional hearing is unlikely to consistently result in 
successful rehabilitation and release, the Attorney General should still 
implement the procedure to provide further opportunities for 
improvement of the alien’s mental health.  Further, the involuntary civil 
commitment hearings should still be held for detainees who refuse 
mental health treatment, because further immigration proceedings are 
unlikely to result in either the alien’s removal from the U.S. or the grant 
of supervised release. 
In addition to creating procedures for involuntary civil commitment 
hearings, the Attorney General should also create an advocacy program 
for “specially dangerous” detainees.  Aliens with severe mental illness 
may be unable to comprehend the removal and post-removal order 
proceedings.215  These aliens are often unable to provide credible and 
coherent information to attorneys or judges, understand a judge’s 
questions, read or write, comprehend their surroundings, or control their 
hallucinations or delusions.216  To ensure that the interests of these 
severely mentally ill detainees are adequately represented in 
immigration proceedings, the government should assign a trained 
advocate or caseworker to each detainee.217  This person would be 
charged with helping the detainee navigate legal proceedings while 
assessing whether the detainee has the capacity to understand the case 
against him.  An advocacy program would be a significant step toward 
protecting an alien’s human rights while simultaneously protecting the 
government’s interests in public safety and effectuating an alien’s 
removal. 
 211. See id. at 86. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. Id. at 5. 
 216. Id. at 6. 
 217. See id. at 82–86 (providing recommendations to ensure fair immigration proceedings for 
aliens with mental disabilities). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Hernandez-Carrera is significant because the decision established 
specific parameters under which removable aliens who are mentally ill 
and who pose a serious danger to the public may be continuously 
detained, as well as the proper relationship between agencies and federal 
courts.218  The Tenth Circuit’s decision balances due process concerns 
with public safety.219  The decision also limits the availability of 
indefinite detention to a very narrow class of removable aliens.220  The 
Supreme Court should accept certiorari when next given the opportunity 
to determine whether the indefinite detention of certain removable aliens 
is constitutionally permissible.  Additionally, Congress should amend 
the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” provision so that the statute’s 
language reflects legislative intent.  The Attorney General should 
similarly modify the “special circumstances” regulation to provide civil 
commitment hearings for indefinitely detained aliens who have been 
diagnosed with severe mental illness.  Doing so will clarify the 
appropriate method of managing “specially dangerous” removable 
aliens, as well as provide uniformity in federal immigration law. 
 218. See Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1011 (2009). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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